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I det følgende giver jeg en kort præsentation af Donald 
Davidsons semantiske analyse af eksplicitte performativer 
og modus. Jeg diskuterer hans strategi for at løse de 
semantiske problemer, der knytter sig til modus og 
argumenterer for, at hans analyse lider under det 
faktum, at han accepterer illokutionær kraft som et 
semantisk primitiv. Dette medfører, at han i stedet for at 
løse et semantisk problem blot flytter problemet fra den 
semantiske analyse af eksplicitte performativer til den 




Donald Davidson’s approach to natural language semantics is founded on two 
main ideas: 
1. Natural language is a special case of rational behaviour. 
2. Extensional first order predicate logic has all the power needed to describe 
and explain natural language meaning. 
 
In brief, this means, firstly, that it does not make sense to detach the study of 
natural language meaning from the studies of action and rational behaviour 
and, secondly, that reference and predication are the basic means by which 
language users relate to the external world. 
In his paper Moods and Performances (Davidson 1979) Davidson addresses a 
number of semantic problems related to grammatical mood along these lines. He 
suggests a Tarski-style semantics that adds to the truth conditions of the 
propositional content a set of truth conditions for the mood-setter, i.e. the 
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expression (e.g. grammatical mood or change of word order) that indicates the 
illocutionary force of the utterance in question. 
In the following I will give a brief presentation of Donald Davidson’s semantic 
analysis of explicit performatives and grammatical mood. On the basis of this 
presentation I will discuss his strategy for solving the semantical problems 
related to these matters and argue that his analysis suffers from the fact that he 
takes illocutionary force to be a primitive. Thus, instead of eliminating a 
semantically unanalysed element he simply removes the problems from the 
analysis of explicit performatives just to reinstate them in the semantic analysis 
of the mood-setter. 
2. DAVIDSON’S ANALYSIS OF EXPLICIT PERFORMATIVES 
As his starting point Davidson takes Austin’s analysis of the so-called explicit 
performatives (Austin 1962), because they present what Davidson calls “an 
intolerable discrepancy between the semantics of certain first-person present-
tense verbs and their other-person other-tense variants” (Davidson 1979: 117). 
According to Davidson this discrepancy is due to Austin’s division between 
indication of illocutionary force and representation of propositional content and 
arises if we accept that the question of truth only concerns the propositional 
content and not the expression that indicates the illocutionary force of a given 
utterance.1 
(1) Jones asserted that it is raining. 
(2) I assert that it is raining. 
 
The two examples illustrate Davidson’s point. (1) is a report of the content of 
Jones’ assertion and (2) is an explicit performative. The main verb in both 
sentences is indicative and the only differences are: 1. a shift from past tense to 
present tense and 2. the substitution of a pronoun for a proper name. Since 
Davidson aims at an extensional truth conditional semantics it is obviously 
intolerable if ‘assert’ in (2) does not contribute to the truth conditions of (2) in 
the same way that ‘asserted’ does in (1). (1) is true if and only if Jones asserted 
that it is raining no matter if it was actually raining at the time of the utterance. 
This, on the other hand, is not the case in (2). Here it seems reasonable to say 
that a speaker who has uttered (2) has said something true only if it was in fact 
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raining at the time of the utterance. To use Austin’s terminology we could say 
that (2) is happy if it was raining at the time of the utterance and unhappy if it 
was not, whereas the happiness of the utterance of (1) is absolutely independent 
of the truth value of the embedded clause in (1). This, however, does not tell us 
whether or not the main clause can be said to represent a set of truth conditions, 
and it does not tell us anything either of how the main verbs in (1) and (2) are 
semantically related. 
To overcome these problems Davidson suggests that we abandon what he calls 
the ‘usual semantics’ for explicit performatives. What Davidson refers to is a 
variety of theories based on Frege’s approach to semantics. Frege (1892) defines 
the meaning of the embedded clauses in speech reports and attitude reports as 
their ‘ungerade Bedeutung’, which means that they, as opposed to non-embedded 
sentences that have truth values as their extensions, are regarded as referring 
expression that have their own intension (i.e. their meaning in the Fregean 
metaphysical sense) as their extension. There are at least two reasons for 
Davidson’s rejection of this approach. Firstly, he wants to avoid at all costs a 
semantic theory that involves any kind of intensionality and, secondly, the 
Fregean approach seems to present the same difficulty as Austin’s approach, 
namely, that we end up with two different meaning concepts (direct and 
indirect meaning) for the same word. 
Instead, Davidson employs the strategy presented in On Saying That (Davidson 
1968). The main features of this strategy are 1. that truth is ascribed to 
utterances, 2. that indirect speech reports are treated as two distinct utterances, 
and 3. that ‘that’ is treated as a referring expression used to refer to utterances. 
Applying this to (1) and (2) we get: 
(3) Jones asserted that. It is raining. 
(4) I assert that. It is raining. 
 
When uttered, (3) and (4) each consists of two distinct utterances of which the 
former contains an expression that refers to the latter. Henceforward I will use 
‘explicitation’ to refer to the first type of utterance and ‘content’ to refer to the 
second. We can now make the following generalization: 
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(5) x α that. p. 
 
It is now clear what Davidson has in mind. Speech reports and explicit 
performatives share the same logical form. Whenever x is replaced by a singular 
referring expression, α is replaced by ‘said’ or any performative verb, and p is 
replaced by any first order sentence2 we get a configuration of sentences that, 
when uttered, will constitute either a speech report (Jones said that. p.), a report 
of a performed speech act (Jones promised that. p.), or an explicit performative (I 
promise that. p.). 
A clear advantage of this result is that we can now use the same semantic theory 
to treat utterances of ordinary descriptive sentences and utterances of explicit 
performatives. In either case the verb in the main clause will be treated as a 
relation that yields either T or F whenever the referring expressions that are 
taken as arguments have proper extensions. Thus, we need no other semantic 
concept than that of truth condition to explain the meaning of the 
explicitation. 
In order to specify the relation between the explicitation and the content, 
Davidson introduces a somewhat unorthodox manoeuvre. Instead of invoking 
some kind of intensional concept Davidson simply conceives of the relation as 
referential. The two utterances are related by the referring expression ‘that’ that 
serves as the second argument in the explicitation. This means that (1) is true if 
and only if Jones asserted that it is raining and that (2) is true if and only if the 
person in question by uttering (2) did in fact assert that it is raining. In either 
case the truth value of the content does not affect the truth value of the 
explicitation. What could affect the truth value of the explicitation would be a 
situation where ‘that’ for some reason failed to refer, where the actual content of 
Jones assertion did not match the content of the speech report, or where the 
person uttering the explicit performative did not for some reason satisfy the 
proper requirements of assertion. 
Granted that we accept the enrichment of our ontology with utterances, 
Davidson has now provided a purely extensional semantics for explicit 
performatives – or has he? There is still one important issue left to be dealt with, 
and it raises the question whether Davidson’s analysis is at all satisfactory. The 
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problem is that the analysis, despite its virtues, so far has told us nothing about 
the fact that even though the relation between the explicitation and the content 
is not truth functional the content of an explicit performative might be used as 
one of the premises in a future deduction, whereas this could never be the case 
for the content of a speech report. To put it differently, the content of explicit 
performatives can sometimes be asserted, whereas the content of speech reports 
can never be asserted. This suggests that Davidson has not succeeded since there 
remains a tinge of intensionality to the content of the speech reports. 
Davidson’s solution is to say that the content of explicit performatives in certain 
situations can be uttered non-assertively (Davidson 1979: 119). Davidson does 
not spell out exactly what it means to utter something ‘non-assertively’, but it 
might be thought of as a special kind of illocutionary force that is used when the 
speaker does not want to be committed to the truth value of the utterance, 
which is indeed the case with the content of both speech reports and attitude 
reports.3 In other words, Davidson uses this special non-assertive force as a 
defence against intensionality as he maintains that there is nothing more to the 
concept of meaning than what can be expressed by specifying truth conditions 
within the framework of extensional predicate logic: Words always have the 
same meaning, i.e. their contribution to the truth conditions is the same no 
matter were they appear. The only thing that differs is the force with which the 
sentence in which they appear is uttered. 
3. DAVIDSON’S ANALYSIS OF MOOD 
With the idea of non-assertion as a special kind of illocutionary force rather than 
as lack of illocutionary force, we have finally reached Davidson’s analysis of 
mood. Having gone through his analysis of explicit performatives the analysis of 
mood seems rather straightforward since the semantic analysis in many respects 
is similar to the analysis of explicit performatives. 
However, there is one important deviation that has to do with the semantic 
representation of illocutionary force. When moving on to the semantic analysis 
of grammatical mood, an obvious approach seems to be the one presented by 
David Lewis in General Semantics (1972). Lewis suggests that we simply reduce all 
other moods to indicative by paraphrasing imperatives, interrogatives4 etc. into 
explicit performatives constituted by two distinct indicative sentences. Yet, 
 5
ULF DALVAD BERTHELSEN 
Davidson rejects this approach because it does not satisfy a number of 
requirements that he poses for a proper treatment of mood: 
1. It must show or preserve the relation between 
indicatives and corresponding sentences in other 
moods; it must, for example articulate the sense in 
which ‘You will take off your shoes’, ‘Take off your 
shoes’, and ‘Will you take off your shoes?’ have a 
common element. 
2. It must assign an element of meaning to utterances in a 
given mood that is not present in utterances in other 
moods. And this element should connect with the 
difference in force between assertions, questions, and 
commands in such a way as to explain our intuition of 
a conventional relation between mood and use. 
3. Finally, the theory should be semantically tractable. If 
the theory conforms to the standards of a theory of 
truth, then I would say all is well. And on the other 
hand if […] a standard theory of truth can be shown to 
be incapable of explaining mood, then truth theory is 
inadequate as a general theory of language. (Davidson 
1979: 115-16) 
 
In relation to Lewis’ suggestion the most important of these requirements is the 
second. Apparently Lewis’ theory does not satisfy this requirement since he 
reduces all other moods to the indicative. This reduction seems to be the cause 
of Davidson’s reluctance: Not only because it reduces the different moods to 
indicative, but also because this reduction apparently has as a consequence an 
elimination of all other types of illocutionary force than the assertive force. 
Davidson’s answer to this problem is to approach mood in the same way as he 
approached the explicit performatives. The only exception is that the mood of a 
given sentence cannot be paraphrased into an explicitation since that would 
yield precisely the corresponding explicit performative. The reason for 
Davidson’s rejection of the paraphrase strategy is not entirely clear, but he seems 
to believe that there are some special irreducible qualities related to the different 
moods and that the semantic analysis of mood must specify exactly what that 
quality is. In order to do so Davidson starts out by saying that all sentence types, 
indicatives as well as non-indicatives, consists of two distinct parts: 1. a mood-
setter and 2. an indicative core. The idea behind this move is the same as before. 
By splitting the utterance in two distinct parts it becomes possible to specify two 
distinct sets of truth conditions. Thus, the utterance of the mood-setter 
irrespective of its manifestation (inflection, change of word order, tone of voice 
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etc.) becomes an independent part of the speech act representing its own set of 
truth conditions. Unfortunately Davidson is not very specific on this point, and 
instead of suggesting a formal procedure of specifying truth conditions for 
mood-setters he gives us a somewhat intuitive formulation: 
The mood-setter of an utterance of ‘Put on your hat’ is true 
if and only if the utterance of the indicative core is 
imperatival in force. (Davidson 1979: 120) 
 
In this case it is the truth conditions for the imperative that has been specified, 
but similarly we could specify the truth conditions for the other moods. Bearing 
in mind that the mood-setter is related to the utterance of the indicative core by 
a referring expression (exactly as we saw it with the explicit performatives), we 
can now generalize Davidson’s formulation by saying that the mood-setter is 
true if and only if the accompanying indicative core is uttered with exactly the 
illocutionary force indicated by the mood by which the mood-setter is 
represented on the surface level (inflection, change of word order, tone of voice). 
This is in short Davidson’s semantic analysis of mood, and we can now return to 
the three requirements to see how they are actually met by Davidson’s proposal. 
As regards the first requirement Davidson shows how the split of the semantic 
interpretation allows the same indicative core to be related to a variety of 
different mood-setters without any changes in its semantics. Thus, the 
requirement is met in the sense that whenever we have different grammatical 
transformations of the same indicative core, we have a systematic way of 
showing that it is in fact the same indicative core but related to a different 
mood-setter. 
As to the second requirement Davidson points out that the relation between 
mood and mood-setter is systematic since a particular mood always expresses the 
same meaning. To be more specific, the utterance of say imperatives always 
counts as an utterance of the imperative mood-setter that in turn always 
represents the same set of truth conditions. This, however, does not mean that 
the relation between mood and mood-setter is conventional in the sense that a 
particular mood can only be used to perform the type speech act to which it is 
conventionally related. Think for instance of Searle’s famous example ‘Can you 
pass the salt?’ or of the utterance of ‘Are you coming’ followed by the utterance 
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of ‘That is an order!’ Instead, it means that the relation between a particular 
mood and its mood-setter is conventional in the sense that the concept of 
illocutionary force is always part of the meaning expressed by a particular mood 
since the concept of illocutionary force is part of the truth conditions 
represented by the mood-setter of that particular mood. This ensures 1. that the 
use of a particular mood (by convention) always expresses the same meaning 
(i.e. represents the same set of truth conditions) regardless of which type of 
speech act it is actually being used to perform, and 2. it ensures that each mood 
expresses something unique since each mood-setter is uniquely related to a 
particular illocutionary force. 
Thus, according to Davidson, we have a way of explaining how a sentence in a 
certain mood can be used to perform a speech act of another type than that 
expressed by its conventional meaning (cf. ‘can you pass the salt?’). 
Unfortunately, Davidson’s presentation lacks transparency. Therefore, it is not 
absolutely clear how he envisages the relation between the conventional mood-
setter and the one changing the force of the utterance, but one way looking at it 
is this: Each mood always contain as part of its meaning the notion of a 
particular illocutionary force. However, in some cases the utterance of a sentence 
in a particular mood contains an element that indicates that the force expressed 
by the mood is overruled. This element might be an additional utterance (‘This 
is an order’), a harsh tone of voice or something quite different, but the point is 
that the meaning of the original mood, despite the overruling, is still present. 
Finally, if we accept that the first requirement is met, we must also accept that 
the third requirement is met. This is due to the fact that Davidson’s split of the 
semantic interpretation that allows him to isolate the indicative core is exactly 
what also allows him to apply the semantic framework sketched in Truth and 
Meaning (Davidson 1967b). Thus, the theory is semantically tractable and it 
seems as if Davidson has succeeded in constructing a theory that satisfies all of 
the three requirements. 
4. THE MEANING OF ‘ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE’ 
Opponents of pure extensional semantics might reject Davidson’s theory all 
together, and even if we accept his foundational ideas mentioned in the 
introduction there are still problems left that need clarification. The most 
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interesting but also the most peculiar of these problems is Davidson’s use of the 
notion of illocutionary force. Since Davidson is a notorious anti-metaphysicist, it 
seems strange that he apparently takes the notion to be primitive in the sense 
that it turns up undefined in the truth condition for the mood-setter. A possible 
explanation of his employment of the notion of illocutionary force is that it is 
supposed to be a defence against proposals like Lewis’ which Davidson believes 
to be a token of inappropriate reductionism. The fact that Davidson puts a lot of 
effort into constructing his theory so that it satisfies the second requirement 
suggests that this is in fact the case. This leaves us with two obvious possibilities: 
either Davidson is right in his belief, and we might have to accept the dubious 
status of the notion of illocutionary force, or he is wrong and his analysis 
collapses into a version similar to Lewis’. 
As announced I will argue that he is wrong, but I will also argue that this does 
not lead to a semantic reduction since the meaning that Davidson tries to 
capture by introducing the notion of force into the specification of the truth 
conditions of the mood-setter is captured perfectly well by paraphrasing the 
moods into explicit performatives. 
The first step is to try to specify exactly what it means for an utterance to be 
uttered with a certain illocutionary force. If we compare it with the celebrated 
Tarski example “’snow is white’ iff snow is white” we remember that the 
interpreter is supposed to have a clear intuition of the meaning of the meta-
language sentence following the bi-conditional, i.e. he is supposed to know that 
‘snow’ refers to snow and ‘white’ to the set of white entities etc. Since this is the 
semantic approach Davidson has chosen for the interpretation of the mood-
setter, it seems fair to ask what clear intuition the interpreter is supposed to have 
of the meaning of the meta-language expression ‘illocutionary force’. 
One way of specifying this is to answer the following question: What conditions 
must an utterance satisfy in order to belong to the extension of predicates such 
as ‘imperative in force’, ‘interrogative in force’ etc. (from now on referred to as 
illocutionary predicates)? The most elaborate attempt to formalize the notion of 
illocutionary acts is made by Searle and Vanderveken (Searle & Vanderveken 
1985; Vanderveken 1990), who, drawing on Searle’s earlier work (Searle 1969), 
define illocutionary force by notions such as direction of fit, preparatory 
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conditions, and sincerity conditions. For the present purpose we can leave out 
the details and just assume that there is a set of necessary and sufficient 
condition for each of the different types of speech acts. Now, if this assumption 
is correct it gives us what we asked for, namely, a clear intuition of what it 
means for an utterance to be e.g. imperative in force. It simply means that all 
members of the set of necessary and sufficient conditions defining the 
imperative force are satisfied. For the imperative force this means among other 
things that it has world-to-word direction of fit, that the speaker prefers the 
outcome of being obeyed, and that the speaker has the proper authority. 
With this semantic interpretation of Davidson’s mood-setter we now turn to the 
explicit performatives in order to compare the semantics of the mood-setter with 
that of the explicitation of the explicit performative. If we accept Davidson’s 
proposal that ‘that’ should be treated as a referring expression, the explicitation 
turns out to be a ternary relation between a subject (the speaker), a direct object 
(the receiver), and an indirect object (the utterance immediately following the 
explicitation). The standard semantic interpretation of di-transitive verbs says 
that a sentence (or, to follow Davidson, the utterance of a sentence) containing 
a di-transitive verb is true if and only if the ordered triple consisting of the 
extension of the subject, the extension of the direct object, and the extension of 
indirect object does in fact belong to the extension of the di-transitive verb. 
Now, what does this mean in relation to explicit performatives? Let us take an 
example: 
(6) ‘I order you that you read ‘The Concept of Truth in formalized Languages’ for 
tomorrow’. 
 
(6) is true if and only if the speaker (denoted by ‘I’) orders the hearer (denoted 
by ‘you’) the content of the utterance of ‘you read ‘The Concept of Truth in 
Formalized Languages’ for tomorrow’ (denoted by ‘that’). Now, in order to 
evaluate the truth value of (6) we need to be a bit more specific as to what 
criteria we might apply in order to decide whether or not the ordered triple 
actually belongs to the extension of ‘order’. An obvious candidate for such a set 
of criteria is, of course, the set of conditions defining the Searle/Vanderveken 
notion of the illocutionary force for orders. If we accept this, it follows that the 
 10
DAVIDSON ON EXPLICIT PERFORMATIVES AND MOOD-SETTERS 
utterance of (6) is true if and only if the three members of the ordered triple 
together satisfy these conditions. 
Thus, it turns out, provided that we accept Davidson’s interpretation of ‘that’ 
and the Searle/Vanderveken definition of illocutionary force, that there is in fact 
no semantic difference between the interpretation of Davidson’s mood-setter 
and the explicitation of the explicit performative. Consequently semantic 
reductionism does not follow from paraphrasing non-indicatives into explicit 
performatives. On the contrary the use of the different non-indicatives appears 
to be equivalent to the use of their corresponding explicit performatives. 
So, it seems that Lewis was right after all. It does seem to be a plausible 
assumption that the non-indicatives can be reduced to explicit performatives 
consisting of two indicative sentences. More interestingly, it follows from the 
analysis that this does not lead to any kind of semantic reductionism, since 
Lewis’ proposal not only meets the first and the third of the requirement posed 
by Davidson on a proper treatment of mood, but, as it turns out, also the 
second. This is so, because we now have a way of showing 1. that the uniqueness 
of the different mood is captured entirely by the illocutionary predicates and 1. 
that since the concept of illocutionary force is part of the meaning of the 
illocutionary predicates, the relation between explicitations and use is 
conventional in exactly the same way as Davidson believes the relation between 
mood and use to be. 
With this, it has also been shown how Davidson’s employment of the notion of 
illocutionary force fails to give the result he had hoped for. The way he states his 
theory leaves only two possibilities. Either the notion of illocutionary force is 
undefined, in which case Davidson has done nothing but replacing Austin’s 
non-truth conditional indication of force with his own similarly dubious notion 
of force, or the notion of force is defined, in which case the meaning of the 
mood-setter has to be equivalent to the explicitation of the explicit 
performatives. 
5. DAVIDSON TODAY 
Despite the fact that Davidson is considered one of the most influential 
philosophers of the late twentieth century, his semantic analysis of intensional 
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contexts and illocutionary acts has not received much attention. Neither this 
nor his dubious employment of the notion of illocutionary force does, however, 
mean that his semantic approach to these matters is irrelevant for contemporary 
linguistics and philosophy of language. 
Indeed, it turned out that Davidson’s rejection of Lewis’s paraphrase strategy was 
not convincing, but accepting Lewis’s paraphrase strategy does not mean, that 
we are compelled to accept his semantic framework as well. Thus, the above 
discussion is not meant as an attempt to reject Davidson’s approach to 
intensionality. Rather, it should be taken as an attempt to eliminate an obscure 
metaphysical notion from the Davidsonian framework in order to make it more 
plausible as an alternative to formalized approaches to natural language 
semantics such as Lewis’s. 
Since Davidson and Lewis wrote their landmark papers in the late sixties and 
seventies, formal semantics has developed tremendously, and the different 
scientific communities with an interest in formal semantics has almost entirely 
chosen in favour of the semantic tradition pioneered by Lewis and perhaps most 
prominently Richard Montague. This is mainly due to the fact that a lot of 
people from linguistics as well as from philosophy and computer science have 
shown a great deal of interest in the computational aspects of natural language 
semantics. Consequently, there seems to be a broad consensus that Davidson’s 
semantic project is a dead end and that his philosophy, except for his event 
semantics (Davidson 1967b), has little to offer contemporary semantics. This, 
however, seems to be a somewhat unfair conclusion. It might be that the 
semantic framework outlined in Davidson (1967b) faces some formal difficulties, 
but that is no argument against the foundational views that underlies 
Davidson’s semantic program. Thus, the insight that action and rational 
behaviour is an important key to understanding natural language meaning poses 
a great challenge to some of the most important contemporary semantic 
theories (see e.g. Asher & Lascarides 2003 and Blackburn & Bos 2005). The 
eagerness to compute meaning has led to theories that focus predominantly on 
interpretation and, therefore, have little to say about the role of the speaker and 
of the nature of reference and predication construed as acts performed by 
rational agents. 
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NOTES 
1 It should be noted that it is not entirely clear that this is actually Austin’s 
view. It is true that there are passages where Austin talks about indication of 
illocutionary force as non-descriptive (e.g. Austin 1962: 70-71), but these are 
found before he arrives at the final distinction between locutionary, 
illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. By making this distinction Austin 
suggests that truth conditions and illocutionary force belongs to two distinct 
strata of the speech act, i.e. the locutionary act and the illocutionary act 
respectively. Davidson does not comment directly on this part of Austin’s 
theory and it is, therefore, not obvious if Austin deserves Davidson’s 
criticism. 
2 Davidson is not being explicit about these matters, but it seems inevitable 
that his analysis will face considerable difficulties if we allow that sentences 
substituting p contain second order expressions, meta-language, embedded 
performatives etc. 
3 The difference between asserting p and uttering p non-assertively might also 
be seen as an analogy to Searle’s distinction between presentation and 
representation (Searle 1983: 23). Searle uses the distinction to explain 
intensional contexts as it allows him to say that a speaker who utters e.g. 
‘John believes that King Arthur slew Sir Lancelot’ presents rather than 
represents the content of the embedded sentence. The difference is that the 
speaker by performing a presentation does not commit himself to the truth 
of the content even though the utterance has truth conditions, direction of 
fit, etc. 
4 Even though interrogatives are marked by a change of word order rather than 
by inflection Lewis treats them similar to the non-indicatives. 
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